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Accidents

E

ven in the flatlands of New Hampshire, the winter of
2012–2013 was, well, wintry. At least, this was true when it came to
snowfall. Such measuring sites as the Randolph Mountain Club’s Gray
Knob shelter partway up Mount Adams saw above-average accumulations—
224 inches compared with the 195-inch average—but a lot of that snow fell
during the second half of the winter. Early on, snow cover was thin. Largely
absent was the cold, at least long stretches of the sort that drives even the
newly moderated windchill readings at the Mount Washington Observatory
on the summit to an astonishing nearly –70 degrees Fahrenheit. And so,
given white footing and stretches of nonthreatening temperatures, last year
was a good winter for snow lovers to be out and about on shoes, spikes, skins,
and sliders in the White Mountains of New Hampshire.
The other weather feature that characterized the winter past was its
variability. The temperatures yo-yoed all across the mountains, and the
cycles of thaw and freeze and the mixes of precipitation brought on wildly
changeable conditions in this most changeable of seasons. That made climbing
unpredictable, often.
	In the Northeast, our footing changes constantly with winter’s endless
variety of cover on sloped terrain; each thickness and composition demands
its own readings and its own responses. Such wild variability separates winter
ascents from summer hiking. Who among us has not felt suddenly exposed
on a familiar summer trail gone over to the ice and snow of winter? I can
thumb through such moments and recall easily a time on a family trail on
my home ridges, where my instep crampons felt suddenly inadequate to the
slant I was crossing for the 200th time. A 20-foot slide into timber seemed
probable; I crept over the next 5 feet. Then the world grew usual again.
In short, there is no such thing as an average winter day in the hills; each must
be attended to individually and carefully.
	It makes sense to meditate on weather and surface variability because
winter’s conditions make it the season in which even little errors increase the
consequences by factors of 3 or 4. A balky zipper, a lost glove, a frayed strap, a
little slip—each can create real trouble where none was imagined.
	I begin my discussion of last winter’s incidents where many of them begin,
with moments of inattention or disorientation.
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Lost and Found
On Friday, January 11, Glen Z., Emily M., Sam B., Sophia G., Kirk J., and
Andrew M., all 19 or 20 years old, climbed Mount Pierce from the Appalachian
Mountain Club’s Highland Center. On the way down, they turned in the
wrong direction onto the Dry River Cutoff Trail, which leads down into the
rough Dry River Wilderness, which Hurricane Irene had savaged in 2011.
The trail they took leads to the Dry River Trail, which, since Irene, had been
closed because of washouts and downed trees.
The Mount Washington Observatory’s weather forecast that day was for
record high temperatures, an unseasonably mild air mass, and the moving
out of a high-pressure system that would let in unusually mild air from
the southwest. Forecasters expected the air to warm to above freezing. The
summits would become foggy under light rain, but overnight, the air would
drop below freezing, the rain would freeze at times, and the result would be
an accrual of glaze ice across the higher summits. The next day was expected
to be foggy and warmer, as high as 40 F, with more light rain.
At approximately 6 p.m., New Hampshire Fish and Game received word
from 911 and the Carroll County Sheriff's Office that six Tufts University students were lost in the Dry River Valley. Using global positioning system coordinates provided by 911, NHFG officers were able to locate the students; in
addition, Lt. James Goss was able to speak with Glen via 911 conference call,
and Goss learned that the students were together off trail some three miles
from the Dry River Trail’s end at Route 302. They were wet and cold and had
started a fire, trying to dry some of their clothing. The temperatures were in
the low 30s and rain and freezing rain were falling. Four officers snowshoed in
from Route 302 over an estimated four-foot-deep snowpack along the damaged Dry River Trail, arriving at 2:30 a.m. The students, unharmed, were then
guided out to the trailhead, where the rescue concluded at around 5 a.m.
Comment: Taking the wrong trail in new territory is common enough,
and, given relatively benign weather of near-record warmth, this misstep
amounted only to the inconvenience of a night out for the students and a
long walk in the dark for NHFG officers. Officers found them to be well
clothed and equipped for their hike.
What troubles me is the familiar lockstep sequence in this rescue: hiker
mistake; unfamiliar territory (“Where are we?”); dial 911; forward to NHFG;
dispatch officers into the night (and/or call volunteers); reach those lost; guide
them out. Given limited resources and tightening budgets, might there be
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also a response that guides hikers toward greater self-sufficiency? This query
assumes that phone calls can go two ways, and I acknowledge that this is
not always the case. But, when it is, might a return call orienting hikers and
suggesting the route to self-rescue be another option to the current Pavlovian,
if-you-call-we-will-respond practice?
The NHFG report put the cost of this rescue at $2,674.58.

Nothing Major
On Sunday, January 6, at about 2:30 p.m., Shannon K., age 21, of Bedford,
New Hampshire, slipped and fell while hiking with a friend on the Boulder
Loop Trail on Mount Major in Alton. Given only a few remaining hours of
daylight, the hikers called 911. Alton Fire Department and NHFG personnel
responded, locating Shannon and carrying her down the trail. They reached
the parking lot at about 4:30 p.m. The hikers carried extra clothing, food,
water, first aid supplies, and a headlamp, and so they were at ease while awaiting rescue.
Comment: Even on a minor mountain such as Major (elevation: 1,785
feet), winter hiking can pose a risk, and these two hikers had packed for their
climb in a commonsense way. Note the cell phone call as rescue trigger.

Going Up There, Eh?
On Sunday, December 30, at about 7 p.m., New Hampshire State Police
notified NHFG that an emergency locator beacon was issuing a signal
from the Mount Lafayette area in Franconia Notch. Bruno B., age 26, of
Sherbrooke, Quebec, and Danny D., whose age was not reported, also of
Sherbrooke, had left home at 6 a.m. with the goal of climbing Lafayette.
The beacon was registered to Bruno. A search began, eventually including
NHFG officers, Mountain Rescue Service volunteers, Androscoggin Valley
Search and Rescue volunteers, and personnel from the New Hampshire Army
National Guard.
The weather forecast for December 30 from the Mount Washington
Observatory warned of “extremely brisk” higher summits, strong winds, and
very cold temperatures. The wind speeds were expected to sustain more than
100 miles per hour for twelve hours beginning late that afternoon and gusting
more than 140 mph that night. Temperatures would drop into the negative
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numbers. The forecast warned, “A dangerous situation is shaping up on the
higher summits later today and tonight, due to the expected combination of
very high wind speeds and cold temperatures. ANY ACTIVITIES ABOVE
TREE LINE OVER THE FORECAST PERIOD WILL BE SEVERELY
IMPACTED BY THE INCOMING WEATHER.”
The initial reading from the beacon located the pair of climbers
approximately 1,000 feet off the Skookumchuck Trail, high on the western
slope of Lafayette. By 3:20 a.m., searchers had reached this point on the
Skookumchuck, but deep snow and thick spruce made it dangerous and
inadvisable to traverse those 1,000 feet. The searchers’ next effort was to climb
to the Garfield Ridge Trail and descend in Bruno and Danny’s footsteps, but
the winds along the ridge made this too dangerous. By 5 a.m., it was clear that
rescuers would need help.
On Monday morning, additional teams joined them, eventually including
a Black Hawk helicopter and crew from the New Hampshire National
Guard. By 8 a.m., searchers were again climbing. At 10 a.m., new data from
the locator beacon showed that the two climbers had descended roughly a
half-mile west of their original location. This sent a team up the Greenleaf
Trail to try to intercept the two men in that sector of the Lafayette Brook
drainage. Just after noon, the helicopter team arrived, and at 12:50 p.m.
spotted the two men, who were then hoisted to safety. Conservation Officer
Lt. James Goss, who interviewed the two men, noted that the men were well
equipped, but that in the severe winds and blowing snow, they had lost the
trail before descending into the Lafayette Brook drainage, where they decided
to activate their beacon.
	NHFG reported use of thirteen NHFG personnel, who put in 54 hours of
work and 111.25 hours of overtime. NHFG also recorded the efforts of eight
volunteers, who averaged 10 hours apiece. And finally, there was the National
Guard helicopter.
Comment: Begin with the obvious: This was a bad stretch of weather in
which to climb into the alpine zone of Mount Lafayette. And I assume that,
if climbers are tech-savvy enough to carry locator beacon warning systems,
then they are tech-savvy enough to monitor the weather forecast. Yes, it was
the weekend, with its window of free time, and yes, the wild weather can be
a lure after days in the climate-controlled rooms of modern life, but—really.
Consider also the rescue. In that same heavy weather, through the night
and morning, rescuers worked and wallowed to reach these men. There’s
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risk in that. And, finally, the rescue was accomplished via Black Hawk
helicopter—there’s both risk and a lot of money spent in that. It’s no sure
thing to bring a helicopter close enough to airlift someone out of a forest at
the same time the wind is coursing over the mountain ridges and furling into
up- and downdrafts. Who pays for all those hours of work and overtime?
That is a continuing question.
Go back to the moment when these hikers decided to fire up their locator
device. The wind and snow had driven them off the Garfield Ridge Trail,
down into the Lafayette Brook drainage. Certainly they were in tough terrain.
But they were also well equipped. Might they have chosen to bivouac for the
night and then see if they could fight their way down the next day? Such a
decision to live with their earlier decisions and attempt self-rescue would have
spared the searchers a night of risk and might have kept the helicopter safely
at home port.
	I have nothing against carrying locator technology, but doing so adds a
burden of restraint to one’s actions. If you are going to fire off your locator
beacon at the first sign of trouble, you shouldn’t be there in the first place.
	I also wonder why NHFG did not recommend seeking payment from the
two climbers. The cost (excluding the helicopter, the cost of which does not
appear in the official report) was nearly $7,101. Might seeking payment both
defray expenses and, if publicized, act to caution future climbers?

Moderate Honor
On Thursday, January 17, a party of twelve people planned to climb Huntington Ravine’s Central Gully as part of a program called Ascents of Honor.
These ascents are part of an effort to honor and help modern war veterans
rejoin the world at home. Keith Z., a veteran working with an artificial leg
resulting from a war injury, is one of the founders of Ascents of Honor. Andy
P., Keith’s partner in the program and an experienced mountaineer, led the
group. A few other factors separated this climb from others in the Whites:
First, the climb had been well publicized and was to be filmed; second, the
group had obtained rare permission to spend the night at the Mount Washington Observatory on the summit. So, the group would only be ascending
on this day.
The group walked up to the Harvard Cabin cabin in the ravine on the
afternoon of January 16 and spent the night there. The next morning, a U.S.
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Forest Service snow ranger came by, warning them about the risk of setting
out in the deteriorating conditions. The group decided to proceed with the
climb and left the cabin at 8:30 a.m.
As ever in winter, the weather forecast played a crucial role in the day.
Zero-degree cold was predicted, but nothing extreme for January. More
ominous were the predictions of a trace to 2 inches of snow and west to
northwest winds increasing to 60 to 80 mph with higher gusts. On that day,
3.6 inches of snow did fall at the observatory. This combination of wind and
snow would load the crusted surfaces of Huntington Ravine with fresh, soft
slabs as the day went on. The USFS snow rangers had rated the avalanche
danger as moderate, meaning that natural avalanches were unlikely, but those
triggered by people were possible.
When the group reached the technical part of the climb, it split into four
groups of three, with each threesome roped together. The climbers ranged
from novices to experienced mountaineers, plus the film crew. These four
teams ascended to the ice bulge in the gully, and then, one by one and on
belay, they climbed the bulge. Once above the bulge, the groups began
to climb at the same time. Near the top of the gully, the lead group, which
included Andy, the overall leader, stepped aside and let the film crew
pass so that crew members could set up their equipment. By now, it was
late afternoon.
The film crew, the first on the slope, triggered an avalanche. This did
not catch that group, but it swept over the second group, carrying the three
climbers down the gully, over the ice bulge to its base. The third team was
caught at first, but the bottom climber managed to arrest the climbers’ falls
with his ice axes. The moving snow carried the fourth team downslope, but
the climbers stopped when their rope snagged an exposed rock.
After the avalanche, the nine climbers still in various positions up on the
route organized and tried to contact those missing by radio and voice. They
got no answer, and when they tried a cell phone, they discovered its batteries
were dead. They then began to descend slowly, making sure that each was
protected by an anchor as he descended. The three who had been swept to the
gully’s base had sustained injuries, but they were able to begin a slow retreat.
They also had a radio tuned to a frequency that enabled them to contact the
caretaker at the Harvard Cabin, and he initiated the calls for rescue. By now,
it was dark.
The USFS, the AMC, and the Mountain Rescue Service responded and
assembled a rescue team of 25. At 6:20 p.m., a snow ranger and the Harvard
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Cabin caretaker reached the threesome that had been carried to the gully’s
base. After ascertaining that the following rescuers could assist these three
and at the request of Andy, the climbing group’s leader, the two rescuers
continued up to where they could see the headlamps of the nine others who
were descending the gully slowly. The rescuers made contact and learned that
the remaining climbers were uninjured and OK.
The next rescuers assisted the injured three climbers and, as sufficient
numbers arrived, carried them on litters to the Harvard Cabin, where they
met the USFS snow tractor that would take them down to Pinkham Notch
and a waiting ambulance. The remaining rescuers ascended to meet the nine
other climbers and assisted them to the Harvard Cabin; from there, the snow
tractor ferried the whole group to Pinkham, arriving at about 11:30 p.m. None
of the injuries was determined to be life threatening.
Comment: Where to begin? The numbers and intent of this group make
this a complex incident for discussion. Those interested in a complete technical dissection of the conditions and the actions will want to read the commentary of the USFS snow rangers on the Mount Washington Avalanche
Center website (mountwashingtonavalanchecenter.org). I have drawn heavily
on this lucid account in summarizing this accident. This site is a must-read
for anyone who ventures into the frozen backcountry. Its authors, the aptly
and wonderfully named USFS snow rangers, offer invaluable predictions and
analysis of the moods and motions of snow in the Mount Washington region.
Their advice can also be applied fruitfully elsewhere.
	I would like to focus my discussion on two words. The first is the word
that rated that day’s avalanche danger: moderate. And the second is honor,
the word describing the very public Ascent of Honor.
The moderate rating is the trickiest on the five-rating scale of avalanche
danger (Low, Moderate, Considerable, High, Extreme); its definition reads as
follows: “natural avalanches unlikely; human-triggered avalanches possible.”
For most of us, this reads as a go rating, even an attractive one, with its soupçon of danger at the end and its natural assurance at the lead. Climbers are,
after all, used to going out to edges, and this moderate edge seems reasonable.
And yet, the moderate edge often brings woe to climbers.
	It is also true that this rating brings out lots of triggers: 24 feet on this
group of twelve people. This rating and its focus on human triggers put a
premium on a climber’s most important safety equipment: the mind and
its ability to assess terrain. In short, a climber must read the snow and any
weather-related changes to it accurately, all day long. The continued wind
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loading of the upper reaches of the gully on January 17 meant that, by day’s
end when the avalanche broke underfoot, the top team of three was climbing
through soft slab estimated at somewhere between knee deep and thigh deep.
That doesn’t feel moderate anymore.
Finally, moderate lies in the sweet spot of our self-perception as rational
beings. It seems to lodge us firmly in the sensible middle; it can even be
seen as synonym for dull. And yet in the often all-or-nothing world of
avalanches, there is no sensible middle. You are either upright on stable snow
or in peril.
All of this makes me wonder if there is a better word for this second-tier
of the five-level rating system. Instead of moderate, possible might describe the
risk. How about caution? (Other suggestions?)
Honor is an adhesive. That’s one of the truths behind the laudable goals
of Ascents of Honor, which are outlined at ascentsofhonor.org. Honor
can bind us to others and it can hold an individual together. Honor is also
volatile, partly because it is so closely held. It can be besmirched, threatened,
crossed, evanescent. Its absence—being without honor—can leave a person
low or desperate.
	It seems then that the twelve climbers had a powerful hand at their backs
as they ascended that day. They would honor Keith’s sacrifices and those of
other veterans, and they would accrue honor from their climb; each would
hold more firmly together from his effort and success. Andy, their experienced
mountaineer/guide, would help ensure this. Finally, they had the honor
of being invited to spend the night at the observatory. Holding or turning
back with all of this honor in front of and behind them would have been
difficult indeed.
And yet, as Andy acknowledged in a gracious letter to the Conway Daily
Sun praising their rescuers, turning back as conditions deteriorated and the
day stretched on would have been the better decision.
	So, is honor a good motivation for climbing? Is climbing a good way to
honor others or attain honor for oneself? I ask these questions with no intent
of disrespect, but instead because examining the mix of mountains and honor
seems a good idea for each of us as we approach higher ground.

One Slip
On the morning of Saturday, January 26, Richard G., age 64, set out with six
friends to climb Mount Adams via King Ravine’s Great Gully. All were well
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In the Great Gully of King Ravine, on Mount Adams, seven experienced climbers
navigated first to the right and then up the top-center snow chute, avoiding ice. But
somewhere near the top, one of them fell and slid 1,500 feet to his death. DOUG MAYER

equipped and experienced. At the ice bulge in mid-gully, the group opted to
go around via the snow gully to the right.
The group’s leader reported conditions to be hard slab snow that made for
a nice boot-ladder up the gully. All of the climbers knew, and wore, crampons.
At the top of the gully, the first five climbers went straight up, and, having
topped out of the ravine, proceeded on to the summit of Mount Adams.
But the sixth climber and group leader, Leo F., chose a little steeper, shorter
exit with harder snow. The seventh climber, Richard, followed the leader.
But when Leo crested the slope, he looked back to check on Richard and could
not see him. Leo surmised that Richard had fallen. He could see a mitten and
what looked like a small trail of blood. Leo began to descend to look for his
companion. Strong winds made any shouted communications impossible;
it was also hard for the 911 operator to hear Leo when he called to report the
missing man.
The observatory forecast patches of fog and clouds lifting to sun and
clouds, increasing northwest winds coming with arctic air, temperatures
dropping to the teens and then below 0, bottoming overnight at about –20 F.
Mike Pelchat, manager of Mount Washington State Park—and a
prominent White Mountain figure on whose account I have based significant
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portions of this report—was involved at a training in Gorham when the call
about the incident came in. He and Diane H. got ready to gear up, and Diane
made calls to Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue (AVSAR) personnel.
NHFG Lt. Doug Gralenski called Pelchat with an official request for a quick
response and AVSAR help. While this group mobilized at the Appalachia
trailhead on Route 2, members received the call indicating that the climbers
had found Richard’s body at the gully’s base, some 1,500 feet (and 1,000
vertical feet) below where he had fallen. At this point, the mission switched
to a somber recovery trek, which would be hard work in the jumbled terrain
of King Ravine floor.
	Over time, help for the remaining six climbers arrived: first, the Randolph
Mountain Club caretaker, Caleb J., then members of AVSAR, then NHFG’s
Advanced Search and Rescue team, and a member of the Mountain Rescue
Service. As more volunteers arrived, the group made its way to the trailhead,
arriving at around 7 p.m.
The cause of Richard’s fall is unknown. Pelchat points out that in years
past, climbers have survived falls down this gully because of plentiful snow
that buried rocks and trees they might hit and provided soft snow at the
bottom. The snow depths last January were still thin, however.
Comment: It’s hard to fault anyone, including the victim, in this accident.
The party was experienced and capable. What such a fall illuminates is
the difference between summer and winter ascents. The Great Gully Trail
tests mountaineers in any season. It is one of a handful of White Mountain
trails that offer real exposure. In summer, a slip or a stumble or a moment of
imbalance may bring on a sit-down and a bruise, but it isn’t likely to take a
hiker on a long, sliding fall with all its batterings. But in winter, when once
beyond an early, fleeting chance to self-arrest, the falling climber becomes a
puppet of gravity.
	Should the climbers have roped together? Perhaps that might have
guarded against such a long sliding fall. But to be effective in the case of a
fall, a rope must be attached to a companion who is securely in place and
able to withstand the pull of the fall. Such anchoring places are often hard to
find or fashion on snow and ice. And the pace of alternating between climbing and belaying—if belay stances can be found—is slow. On a route such
as that day’s Great Gully, steep but with good snow and so not worrisome to
experienced climbers, it seems unlikely that a group would form roped teams.
Instead, even though part of a group, each of the seven climbers was on his
own when it came to balance, slippage, and safety.
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	Still, in the aftermath of such a fall, the question hovers for us all, leaving
an echo of What if.
Added note: Richard’s age (64) may draw attention and a raised eyebrow
or two. Shouldn’t climbers that age stick to less taxing terrain? There is no
general answer to this. Richard was, by reports, in good condition and experienced. Modern fitness regimens keep extending their adherents’ active lives,
and so, as long as he or she is fit, each climber must make his or her own
assessments about how long to keep going up.

Then Gone
On Friday, March 1, James W., 24, left the Harvard Cabin in Huntington
Ravine with the intent of climbing a number of the ravine’s gullies. Based on
what he said to some people, and judging by the footprints later detected,
James probably climbed Odell Gully, descended into the bottom of South
Gully, and then set out up Pinnacle Gully. Approximately two-thirds of the
way up this gully, he triggered a slab avalanche, which carried him halfway
down an area known as the Fan, where a hiker found him at about 3 p.m. The
hiker, a medical doctor, called 911 to report the accident; he reported also that
the climber showed no vital signs and was dead. USFS snow rangers came to
the scene and confirmed the hiker’s diagnosis, then prepared James’s body for
the trip down to Pinkham Notch.
	Snow rangers then investigated and gathered details from climbers who
ascended Pinnacle Gully the next day. The avalanche had begun in the upper
reaches of the second pitch of the ice climb, just below a narrowing of the
gully. The crown line of the avalanche was 20 to 30 feet above the estimated
position of the climber; the crown line was 2 feet deep and 20 feet wide,
and the snow slid on a bed of water ice. Avalanche danger was rated
as moderate.
Comment: Here is the moderate rating again—see my discussion of the
January 17 incident for thoughts about this rating. James climbed solo, but
I can’t find fault there. Climbing with partners does not guarantee that an
avalanche won’t sweep both or all to the bottom of a route. Each of us should
have the freedom to go off on his or her own. What climbing or wandering
alone does do is concentrate responsibility to a single point—the climber. No
one else can talk over the conditions, no one else is there to read the snow. So
a clear sense of one’s experience and ability is the most important safeguard a
solo climber or hiker takes into the hills.
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End Point
Anyone reading this column shares with its author a fascination with the ways
in which we go to our mountains and the misfortunes and mistakes that mix
with the obvious joys we find there. For my own modest (should I say moderate?) forays into the hills, I often complete the following exercise:
•  Choose a time when your actions (or inactions) might have precipitated
a rescue.
• What did you do (or not do)? How do you explain your actions in
hindsight?
• How has this incident informed your approach to the mountains?
I find that doing so helps keep hubris at bay, both when I’m on foot and when
I sit at the keyboard analyzing others’ errors. And sometimes it makes me
smarter for my next approach to the hills.
—Sandy Stott
Accidents Editor
Sources: New Hampshire Fish and Game incident files, Mount Washington
Avalanche Center forecasts and accident summaries, Mount Washington
Observatory records, and commentary and forums on the online Views from the
Top (vftt.org).
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“I started reading Appalachia for the accident reports, but I kept
reading for the great features.” — Mohamed Ellozy, subscriber
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